Purpose
Provide a consistent response process for incidents involving:
AnyDesk, TeamViewer, HopToDesk, Quick Assist or similar tools
Fake IT/support calls
Social-engineering attacks
Suspicious remote-control sessions
Credentials disclosed to an unknown party
Unexpected MFA approvals
Suspicious software or commands executed on a company device
1. Roles and Ownership
IT Operations
IT Ops owns the initial response and immediate containment.
Responsibilities:
Contact the user
Open/update the FreshService incident
Gather basic facts
Contain the workstation - How to Isolate an Endpoint in CrowdStrike Falcon | Knowledge Base | SLG IT Support
Reset credentials when required
Revoke user sessions
Preserve evidence
Notify Cybersecurity
Assist with endpoint recovery
IT Ops should not attempt a deep forensic investigation independently.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity owns the security investigation and determination of compromise.
Responsibilities:
Review CrowdStrike/EDR telemetry
Investigate malicious processes/scripts
Review Entra sign-ins and identity activity
Investigate persistence
Review Microsoft 365 activity
Assess potential data exposure
Search for related indicators across the environment
Determine clean vs reimage
Determine Privacy/Legal escalation requirements
Approve removal of containment
IT Leadership
Notify IT leadership for:
P1 incidents
Multiple affected users/devices
Privileged/admin compromise
Significant business impact
Potential sensitive-data exposure
Confirmed data exfiltration
2. Severity
P1 – Critical
Use P1 when:
Attack is actively occurring across multiple systems
Multiple users/devices are affected
Administrator/privileged credentials are compromised
Lateral movement is suspected
Ransomware/destructive activity is detected
Significant or sensitive data appears to have been accessed/exfiltrated
Action: Immediate Cybersecurity + IT leadership escalation.
P2 – High
Use P2 when:
Unknown person obtained remote control
Credentials were disclosed
Unexpected MFA was approved
Unknown software/scripts were executed
Administrator privileges may have been provided
Suspicious sign-ins are identified
Persistence may exist
Action: Contain and immediately engage Cybersecurity.
P3 – Medium
Use P3 when:
Suspicious contact occurred but access was not granted
Remote software was downloaded but not used
Credentials/MFA were not provided
No evidence of malicious activity exists
Action: Investigate and document.
3. IT Ops – Initial Response
IT Ops should follow the separate:
IT Ops – Suspected Remote Access Incident: First 15 Minutes
At minimum:
Contact user
Determine what happened
End active attacker access
Contain device if appropriate
Protect user identity
Preserve evidence
Escalate to Cybersecurity
4. Immediate Endpoint Containment
If unauthorized remote control occurred:
Contain the device using CrowdStrike.
If CrowdStrike containment cannot be completed immediately:
Disconnect Ethernet
Disable Wi-Fi
Important
Do NOT:
Power off the device unless directed
Delete suspicious files
Clear browser history
Uninstall the remote-access application
Run cleanup tools
Reimage the workstation
These actions may destroy useful evidence.
5. Identity Containment
If credentials may have been exposed:
Reset user password
Revoke Entra/Microsoft 365 sessions
Review recent sign-ins
Review registered MFA/authentication methods
Remove unknown authentication methods
Temporarily block sign-in when active compromise is suspected
Require MFA re-registration when the existing MFA configuration cannot be trusted.
6. Cybersecurity Escalation Triggers
Immediately engage Cybersecurity when ANY of the following occurred:
Unknown party obtained remote control
Password was entered/shared
Unexpected MFA was approved
Commands/scripts were executed
Unknown software was installed
Administrator privileges were granted
Suspicious sign-ins were detected
Persistence is suspected
Company data may have been accessed
Multiple devices/users may be affected
7. Evidence Preservation
Collect and preserve where available:
User statement
Screenshots
Emails
Teams messages
Phone number/contact information used by attacker
Websites/URLs
Remote-access software name
Remote session ID
Installer files
Suspicious files
Browser download history
CrowdStrike telemetry
Windows logs
File hashes
Relevant timestamps
Document timezone when recording timestamps.
8. Build the Incident Timeline
Document:
Initial contact
User response
Remote tool download
Remote tool launch
Remote-control connection
Credential entry
MFA activity
Commands/scripts executed
Software installed
Files/applications accessed
Network activity
Containment
Identity remediation
The goal is to understand exactly what occurred between initial contact and containment.
9. Endpoint Investigation – Cybersecurity
Review CrowdStrike/endpoint telemetry for:
Remote-access software execution
PowerShell
Command Prompt
Scripts
Child processes
Suspicious downloads
Temporary files
New executables
Network connections
DNS activity
Credential-access attempts
Privilege escalation
10. Persistence Review
Check for:
Scheduled Tasks
Windows services
Startup items
Registry Run/RunOnce entries
New local accounts
New local administrators
Additional remote-support tools
Browser extensions
Unknown scripts/executables
11. Entra / Microsoft 365 Investigation
Review:
Successful sign-ins
Failed sign-ins
Source IP addresses
Geographic locations
Device information
MFA events
Conditional Access results
Password changes
Authentication-method changes
Device registrations
Group membership changes
Privileged role assignments
12. Cloud Persistence Review
Exchange Online
Check:
Inbox rules
Mail forwarding
External forwarding
Delegates
Suspicious sent messages
Deleted messages
Entra / Microsoft 365
Check:
New OAuth consent
Enterprise applications
Authentication methods
Device registrations
Privileged assignments
Changing the password alone does not guarantee that cloud persistence has been removed.
13. Data Exposure Review
Review relevant Microsoft 365 audit activity.
OneDrive / SharePoint
Determine whether files were:
Viewed
Downloaded
Uploaded
Deleted
Shared externally
Exchange
Review:
Mailbox access
Sending activity
Forwarding
Inbox rules
Message deletion
Other Business Applications
Review access to systems such as:
Financial systems
HR applications
Administrative portals
POS/retail systems
Other systems accessible by the affected account
14. Scope Expansion / Threat Hunt
Search the environment for identified indicators:
IP addresses
Domains
URLs
File hashes
Remote-support session IDs
Remote-access applications
Suspicious filenames
Similar CrowdStrike detections
Related user accounts
Determine whether the incident affected additional users or devices.
15. Recovery Decision
Clean and Return
May be appropriate when:
Investigation explains all observed activity
No persistence was identified
No privileged execution occurred
Endpoint integrity can be confidently established
Reimage
Preferred when:
Administrator privileges were obtained
Unknown scripts/commands were executed
Persistence was identified
Security controls were disabled
Multiple unknown applications were installed
Endpoint integrity cannot be confidently established
Simple Rule
If we cannot confidently prove the device is clean, rebuild it.
16. Recovery Checklist
Before releasing the endpoint:
Password secured
Sessions revoked
MFA validated
Authentication methods validated
Suspicious sign-ins investigated
Mailbox rules/forwarding validated
OAuth/application consent reviewed
Endpoint investigation completed
Persistence ruled out
Malicious software removed or device reimaged
CrowdStrike operational
Data exposure assessment completed
Cybersecurity approves recovery
Only then remove endpoint containment.
17. Privacy / Legal Escalation
Cybersecurity determines whether Privacy, Legal or senior leadership must be engaged.
Possible triggers:
Customer information accessed
Employee information accessed
Financial/payment data affected
Confidential business information exposed
Files downloaded/exfiltrated
Regulatory/contractual reporting may be required
IT Ops should escalate the facts and should not independently determine whether the event is legally considered a breach.
18. Incident Closure
Document in FreshService:
Incident summary
Severity
Root cause / likely cause
Timeline
Affected user(s)
Affected device(s)
Applications/systems affected
Indicators of compromise
Identity impact
Endpoint impact
Data-exposure determination
Containment actions
Investigation findings
Recovery actions
Business impact
Lessons learned
Follow-up actions and owners
19. User Education
After containment, review with the user:
Fake IT/support calls
Remote-access scams
Social-engineering warning signs
MFA approval risks
Approved IT support procedures
How to report suspicious activity immediately
The objective is prevention and education — not blame.
Quick Decision Matrix
| What Happened? | Required Response |
|---|---|
| Suspicious contact only | Document and assess |
| Remote tool downloaded | Endpoint review |
| Remote tool launched | Endpoint + EDR review |
| Unknown party obtained remote control | Contain + Cybersecurity |
| Password entered/shared | Reset + revoke sessions |
| Unexpected MFA approved | Revoke sessions + identity investigation |
| Unknown MFA method found | Remove + re-secure MFA |
| Software installed | Contain + Cybersecurity |
| Scripts/commands executed | Cybersecurity investigation |
| Admin access provided | High risk; consider reimage |
| Company data potentially accessed | Data exposure assessment |
| Data exfiltration confirmed | Cybersecurity + Privacy/Leadership escalation |
| Multiple users/devices affected | P1 escalation |
| Endpoint integrity uncertain | Reimage |
| No compromise found | Document, recover and close |
Core Rule
Remote control = contain the endpoint.
Credentials/MFA exposed = contain the identity.
Unknown commands/software = Cybersecurity investigation.
Possible company-data access = exposure assessment.
Cannot prove the endpoint is clean = rebuild it.